



Laser Safety at NASA's New Laser Ranging Stations

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https://archive.org/details/gov.ntis.ava13574vnb1







- AS-6029 Performance Criteria for Laser Control Measures Used for Aviation Safety
- ◆ ANSI Z136.1 American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers
- IEC 60825-1:2014 Safety of laser products Part 1: Equipment classification and requirements
- SAE ARP5293A Safety Considerations for Lasers Projected in the Navigable Airspace
- FAA AC.70-1B Advisory Circular on Outdoor Laser Operations
 ... and more, depending on locale





- Support local, remote, fully automated operations
- Protect people on the ground as well as aircraft
- FAIL-SAFE
- Completely Separated from the Operational Software





Why?

- > NASA-GB-8719.13 Software Safety Handbook (available to the public)
- Safety-critical software includes <u>hazardous</u> software (which can directly contribute to, or controls hazard)
- ➤ A <u>hazard</u> is the presence of a potential risk situation that can result in or contribute to a mishap
- A <u>mishap</u> is an unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment, property, or

damage to the environment; an accident

- All software identified as safety-critical must undergo an increasingly rigorous and independent testing process dependent on classified criticality
- Safety critical software is expensive and time consuming, Pandora's Box








- ELIMINATE Don't include any safety reliant features in the operational software, rely on hardware and simple firmware
 - Software can read statuses and 'enable' the removal of blocks, but cannot make other safety decisions
- ISOLATE If any safety reliant code is deemed necessary, isolate it from the main software package as much as possible
- **SIMPLIFY** Small programs, easy to read



Block Diagram





Developed by KBR Preliminary Design

6/27/2018



Equipment for the Ground







Entryway Interlocks


Fail-safe blocks/attenuators

- Designed, built and tested by KBR/Wyle
- Uses heritage design with innovations
- Upgraded
 electronics and failsafe connections for sensors



Sensor Placement in the SGSLR Shelter








GTA, Optical Bench, and Dome










Aircraft Detection Methods





Active Radar



TBAD Transponder



ADS-B Receiver



Mount Observers




Site Placement Matters



Airspace comparison between two core sites:



GGAO



MGO





Method	Why use?	Sites
Active Radar*	Detects non-cooperative targets, Approved by FAA in high air traffic areas	MOBLAS 4,5,6,7,8, <mark>GGAO, MGO</mark>
TBAD Transponder	Directional, No Angle computation required, Computationally Simple	APLLRS
ADS-B Receiver	Economical and Ubiquitous	Ny-Ålesund
Mount Observers	Can be used anywhere	TLRS 3,4


*When collocated with VLBI, masking and coordination need to take place. The main lobe of an active radar can damage the receiver, while even side lobes can saturate the signal







- Aircraft avoidance system (AAS) for the Laser Safety Subsystem in Ny-Ålesund is being developed by the Norwegian Mapping Authority
- Will be the first operational station in the NASA Network to utilize ADS-B (radio silence required by law, so no radar)
- Unique shelter and sensor placement considerations










- Interface Control Document describes coupling of NASA/KBR Laser Safety Electronics with NMA developed AAS
- AAS modularly connects to standard SGSLR electronics with minimal modification
- ◆ AAS handles locale specific requirements, such as airport communication



For more information on the AAS, please see the poster Laser Safety in Ny-Aalesund: Aircraft Avoidance System (AAS)







Thank you!

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